

RESTRICTED TO PARTICIPANTS OF THE GALLE SYMPOSIUM (DRAFT AUGUST 1, 2010)

The LTTE Shipping Network

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Introduction:

The LTTE maintained a shipping network unrivalled by any other threat group in history. As the LTTE is a large secret organization, no one single person knew the entire structure, processes and assets of the group. As the life line to the LTTE was considered its shipping network, this component of the LTTE was considered the most secretive. Over the years, LTTE ships, procurement officers, captains and ships have come to the attention of law enforcement, military, intelligence and other government agencies. Based on interviews with LTTE ship crew including captains, this article seeks to shed light on the LTTE shipping network.

Since LTTE's defeat, the LTTE procurement and shipping network is engaged in human smuggling. While the LTTE ship Princess Easwary also known as Ocean Lady engaged in human smuggling reached Canada in October 2009, another LTTE ship Sun Sea is likely to reach Canada in August 2010.

The LTTE Organization:

After 30 years of fighting, the Sri Lankan government militarily defeated the LTTE in May 2009. One of the world's most ruthless terrorist and guerrilla groups, the LTTE wanted to create an ethnically pure enclave in the north and the east of Sri Lanka. Founded by Velupillai Prabhakaran,² the group was originally established as the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) in 1974 and evolved into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 5, 1976. Born in Jaffna on November 26, 1954, Prabhakaran murdered Alfred Duraiappa, the then Tamil Mayor of Jaffna on July 27, 1975. To raise funds for his group and activities, the LTTE committed its first robbery of a bank on August 31, 1977. The LTTE committed the first murder of a policeman in Jaffna on December 14, 1977. The LTTE also killed the policemen involved in the investigations into crimes committed by the LTTE. Determined to disrupt the civil and political administration, the LTTE mostly killed Tamils associated with or a part of the government.

The LTTE envisioned a four phased strategy:

- (1) “Disruption of State’s Intelligence System in the Tamil Homeland by eliminating the persons concerned, and their civilian informants, who identified as traitors.
- (2) Launching of an armed campaign aimed at paralyzing the Police, Civil & Political Administrative systems in Tamil Eelam, with guerrilla attacks.
- (3) Ambushes and direct engagements with the Armed Forces
- (4) The conversion of its guerrilla forces into a revolutionary people’s army with the participation of the Tamil masses.”³

2.3. In response to the escalating violence by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Army was summoned to assist the Police to maintain law and order in the predominantly Tamil North. On October 25, 1981, the LTTE killed the first soldier. On July 21, 1983, the LTTE activated the first landmine in Jaffna, killing 13 soldiers. In response, Sinhalese mobs in the South retaliated and attacked Tamil households and places of work in the South. With the deterioration of security conditions, several tens of thousands of Tamils living in the south either fled to the north and east or travelled overseas. This watershed event changed the complexion of the conflict for two reasons. First, the anger, resentment, and the suffering of the Tamil territorial, migrant and diaspora communities were harnessed by the LTTE and several other Tamil militant groups. Second, over geopolitical and electoral compulsions, both the Government of India and the State government of Tamil Nadu started to support the LTTE and the other Tamil groups. The LTTE broad based its organization and increased its recruitment drive, both to the military and political wing. The fighting power of the LTTE grew significantly between July 1983 and July 1987. To create an ethnically pure north and east in Sri Lanka, the LTTE developed a global strategy to harness the Tamil migrant and diaspora community.

The LTTE’s Trajectory:

The LTTE pursued a strategy of fighting and negotiating to achieve its goal of an independent Tamil State. With the assistance of India, Norway and then the international community, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government engaged in several rounds of peace talks. However, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s uncompromising stance of creating an independent Tamil State prevented a resolution. Beginning with the Thimpu talks in Bhutan mediated by India, talks were held in two rounds from 13 July 1985 - 17 August 1985. The Sri Lanka government delegation of 10 and Tamil delegation of 13 (comprising two from each of TELO, EPRLF, EROS, PLOTE and LTTE and three from the TULF) and five Indian officials met. The governments of India and Sri Lanka signed an Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987 but the LTTE returned to violence on October 8, 1987. While the LTTE declared war against the Indian Peace Keeping Force, the

other Tamil militant groups entered mainstream politics. A total of 1155 peacekeepers were killed by the LTTE and over 3000 were injured. Since then, the LTTE engaged in peace talks with three administrations – the Premadasa, Kumaratunge and Rajapaksa but they all culminated in LTTE returning to war. Prabhakaran was determined to use every opportunity including peace talks to build its military capability. As such, all attempts at peace including the Indian and Norwegian peace processes failed. The LTTE assassinated or attempted to assassinate both the Indian and Sri Lankan leaders involved in the talks as well as other leaders.

As the LTTE adopted guerrilla and terrorist tactics, the group came to be known as a terrorist group. With Sri Lanka's ceremonial military overreacting to LTTE attacks resulting in civilian deaths and injuries, Tamil support and sympathy for the LTTE grew. Until the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, a former Prime Minister of India on May 21, 1991, a segment of the Tamil population who were exposed to LTTE propaganda regarded the LTTE as freedom fighters. Nonetheless, the LTTE continued to kill civilians to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government, a practice Prabhakaran continued until the very end. The LTTE staged the first suicide attack on May 07, 1987 at Nelliady in Jaffna, LTTE cadre Vasanthan alias Captain Miller launched a suicidal attack on the security forces using a vehicle laden with explosives. Due to the attack, 17 personnel were killed and 21 injured. No country had suffered the loss of high quality leaders as Sri Lanka. With 17 others, Ranjan Wijeratne, the Foreign Minister and Minister of State for Defence, was killed by the LTTE in a suicide bombing on March 02, 1991. The LTTE assassinated the Navy Chief of Sri Lanka Admiral Clancy Fernando on November 16, 1992. The attack killed 3 others and injured 2. On May 1, 1993, the LTTE assassinated the President of Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa. The President was walking on Armour Street, Colombo 1, to address the May Day rally. The suicide bomber penetrated the presidential household during the peace talks. The attack killed 23 and injured 18. On October 24, 1994, a LTTE suicide bomber assassinated Gamini Dissanayake, the Presidential candidate and Opposition leader at Totalanga, Colombo. The attack killed about 50 and injured 17 people. On January 31, 1996, the LTTE conducted a suicide attack on the Central Bank of Sri Lanka killing 73 and injuring 1937. The LTTE attempted to assassinate Chandrika Kumaratunge, the President of Sri Lanka at a political rally at Town Hall in Colombo on February 18, 1999. On July 29, 1999, a LTTE suicide bomber killed Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam, a Tamil politician, a lawyer and an intellectual. In addition to 2 killed, 8 were injured. On June 7, 2000, a LTTE suicide bomber killed C.V. Gunaratne, the Minister of Industrial Development. The attack killed 22 and injured 64.

During LTTE – Sri Lanka government ceasefire, the LTTE killed Lakshman Kadirgamar, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister, a Tamil, and a lawyer. The attack on August 12, 2005, caused worldwide condemnation. As the government did not retaliate, the LTTE persisted in its attacks prompting the government to break the

ceasefire. A LTTE female suicide bomber attempted to assassinate the Army Chief Lt. General Sarath Fonseka. The attack on April 25, 2006, killed 8 and injuring 22 including the Army Chief. On June 15, 2006 at 0750 hrs at the remote hamlet of Kongollewa, the LTTE blasted a state owned bus with powerful claymore mines killing 64 and injuring 40 passengers seriously. On June 17, 2006, the government recovered equipment of LTTE frogmen who attempted to attack naval crafts at Colombo Harbor. On June 26, 2006, a suicide bomber killed Major General Parami Kulatunge, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff and three others in Pannipitiya, Maharagama. In an attempt to assassinate the Pakistan High Commissioner in Colombo, the LTTE detonated a mine on August 14, 2006. The blast targeting the diplomat killed seven people.

The LTTE emerged as the undisputed world leader in suicide terrorism.⁴ The LTTE technology inspired and influenced other groups to copy its tactics from maritime suicide operations to human-borne suicide attacks.⁵ In Sri Lanka, the LTTE continued in its campaign of political violence especially its application of terrorism. As such, several countries criminalized membership of and support for the LTTE. After the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, India banned the LTTE on May 14, 1992. Malaysia on February 19, 1996, Canada on August 19, 1997, USA on October 8, 1997, U.K. on February 28, 2001, and EU on May 29, 2006 designated, proscribed and banned the LTTE.

LTTE International Infrastructure:

The LTTE build a state of the art international network to sustain its campaign in Sri Lanka. Appointed by Prabhakaran, Selvarasa Pathmanathan alias Tharmalingam Shanmugam Kumaran alias Kumaran Pathmanathan alias K.P. Born on April 6th, 1955 in Kankasanthurai, Sri Lanka, he was the head of LTTE's international finance, procurement and shipping network from 1984-2003. He was reappointed and served briefly in 2009 until he was arrested in Malaysia and deported to Sri Lanka.

As the LTTE was designated, proscribed or banned for its role in terrorism, the LTTE operated through innocuous sounding organizations. The LTTE operated through several front, cover and sympathetic organizations that took the face of human rights, humanitarian, social, cultural, educational, political, religious, medical, community, commercial, charity and nonprofit organizations. They included:

World Tamil Movement (WTM), No. 58, Primway, Nepean, Ontario, Canada K 2 H - 858.

WorldTamil Movement (WTM), No. 64, Eaton Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada MJW - 275.

The Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCCF) - No. 341, Rue des Pyrenees, Paris, France - 75020.

Eelam House at No. 202, Long Lane, London SE 1 4 QB.

LTTE International Secretarial at No. 211, Katherine Road, East Ham, London EC 6, IBC

The World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC), Hof Jelklin, 7415 Rodels, Chur, Switzerland

The World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC) P.O. Box 375, Preston, Victoria 3072, Australia

The World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC) No. 170-10, Cadacraft Road, Suite I-L, Jamaica, New York, USA.

Tamil Co-ordinating Committee, P.O. Box 1699, Vika, 0110 Oslo-1, Norway and Postboks 176, Furuset, 1001 - Oslo, Norway

Tamil Confederation, P.O. Box 340251, 5270 Gummersbach 34, Germany

The New Zealand Tamil Society, P.O. Box 6428, Wellesely Street, Auckland, New Zealand

Tukh Guest House, No 34/3, Soi Sri Bumphen – Rama IV Road, Bangkok 10120

LTTE, P.O. Box 477600, Struer, Denmark

P.O. Box 10625, Denhan, Netherlands

TRO, No. 104, Prince Edward Street, Durban 400, South Africa

Palmax Co. Ltd., 268, Moo 1, Nonglong, King Am Purm, Wiangnonglong, Lamphun 51120, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

The World Tamil Relief Fund (WTRF), Malaysia

LTTE Propaganda and Financial Network:

The LTTE organization in Sri Lanka focused on propaganda, recruitment, training and fighting. The LTTE international organization focused on propaganda, fundraising, procurement and shipping. LTTE propagandists and fund raisers overseas played a pivotal role in supporting the terrorist activities in Sri Lanka. Their aboveground activity is carried out through LTTE fronts such as the Canadian Tamil Congress, Illankai Tamil Sangam in the US, Tamil Sydney, etc.

They support the LTTE umbrella, the Global Tamil Forum led by Father S.J. Emmanuel, the de jure leader and Nediyan, the de facto leader. To continue the fight for separatism, the end goal, the LTTE through GTF and its country affiliates engage Western politicians, to make statements that promote their cause. Some politicians susceptible to constituency pressure are lured by votes and campaign funds. The politicians exercise pressure on government bureaucracy not to act against the LTTE infrastructure and their operations. Furthermore, through LTTE owned and operated media such as TamilNet and human rights groups such as Human Rights for Tamils (HURT), the LTTE seek to influence the mainstream media and human rights groups.

Increasing the LTTE generated its funds from criminal activity. To legitimize LTTE international criminal activities, the LTTE political networks in the diaspora canvassed host country support. The traditional nexus between these two structures continues. The LTTE shipping, procurement and facilitators that traditionally provided the logistics and supplies have reorganized themselves to engage in commercial including criminal activity. As criminal activity especially human smuggling is highly profitable, both the procurement officers and ship managers engaged in it to profit either for themselves or for the group. They included Ravishankar Kangarajah in Canada, Shanmugasundaran Kanthaskaran in the UK, Chandran in the Netherlands, Ponniah Anandarajah in Thailand, Kandiahpillai Bakerathan alias Bhavi alias Bahi alias Khan in Indonesia, and others. They take instructions from Nediyan, the LTTE leader in Norway.

The amount of funds generated within Sri Lanka by the LTTE was modest, when compared to the colossal amounts of funds generated overseas. The LTTE generated between USD 250-200 million annually after 2003.⁶ Until LTTE diversified during the ceasefire, LTTE income was less. Prior to 2003, the LTTE raised US \$40- 80 millions per annum.⁷

The bulk of the funds were generated in the West, especially in Canada.⁸ In addition to procuring dual user technologies, the funds transferred from LTTE fronts in Canada through Malaysia was used to procure arms, ammunition and explosives.⁹ The sources of finance for the LTTE varied:

Through LTTE front, cover and sympathetic Organizations

Commercial shipping network carrying cargo

Tamil cultural shows

Tamil Dramas

Tamil Sport Festivals

Dinner Parties

Musical Shows

Photographic exhibitions

Till Collection campaign

Eelam Book exhibitions

Narcotics Trafficking

Human Trafficking

Newspapers & other publication

Usage of Satellite Telephones

LTTE websites

Usage of Telephone Cards

Establishing Hindu Temples

Financing businesses

Profit sharing ventures

Extortion

Individual contributions

Three income generating methods adopted by the LTTE:

Instant Income Generating Methods (IIG)

Varied Income Generating Method (VIG)

Fixed Income Generating Methods (FIG)

The sequence of these three stages elaborates how the financial sustainability of the LTTE grew from local level led by extortions to a massive global business network. Human smuggling remains one of the major sources of revenue for the LTTE.

LTTE Human Smuggling:

The illegal movement of Sri Lankans has evolved since the ethnic riots of July 1983. Traditionally, tens of thousands of Tamils fleeing the LTTE-Sri Lankan military fighting settled in the south of the country. Although there has not been organized violence since then and a million Tamils live in the south, chain migration both legal and illegal has continued. The patterns of smuggling have changed over the years. But the determinant has been the pull factor and not the push factor. Countries that readily accept refugees and grant asylum status easily and countries that offer significant benefits have become the most favored destination countries. In contrast to classic definition of human smuggling, most Sri Lankans move voluntarily and with the objective of gaining employment overseas. The exceptions are terrorists and criminals who wish to evade the law enforcement authorities. Unlike other conflict zones, the illegal migration from Sri Lanka is largely for economic reasons. Upon entry to a destination country, some immigration lawyers and most immigration agents in the West recommended a story line that illegal migrants adopted and repeated. It was either they were fleeing from the LTTE or from the military. The truth is that most relocated to the west for economic opportunities. Immediately after receiving papers, most Tamils returned to Sri Lanka to spend time with their relatives and friends.

In Sri Lanka, illegal movement of Sri Lankans is carried out by individuals and small groups. By ethnicity, they are Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim Sri Lankans. These individuals and groups engage in human smuggling for profit. Prior to May 2009, they obliged requests by the LTTE and other violent groups in their area to move people. Today, the illegal migrants are both Tamils and Sinhalese. There are three principal routes used by Sri Lankan human smugglers to move Sri Lankans. First, Sri Lanka-Singapore by air, Singapore-Malaysia by road, Malaysia-Indonesia or Malaysia-Thailand by road, sea or flight. As Singapore is visa free for Sri Lankans, most Sri Lankans fly to Singapore. Second, Sri Lanka-Southeast Asia by sea. After the naval cordon was removed, boats leave both the Sri Lankan west and the east coast to Southeast Asia. Third, Sri Lanka to India and from India to Southeast Asia. The human smuggling networks especially in Chennai work with their Southeast Asian counterparts. From Southeast Asia, Sri Lankans will either travel by sea or air to destination countries.

The illegal movement of Sri Lankans in the post-conflict phase is no longer driven by the conflict. A major challenge for host governments, the most favored transit countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Timor Leste and destination countries include Australia, Europe, and Canada. As in the past, the role of the LTTE in human smuggling is limited but is very significant because the LTTE motive is both to move its own members for regrouping and to raise funds. Until May 2009, the focus on the LTTE ships was to move arms, ammunition, explosives and other supplies to sustain the fight. The ships transported out LTTE cadres wishing to travel overseas both to serve the LTTE logistical network in Indonesia, its main base outside Sri Lanka, and to relocate to other countries to support the fight. As per records of Sri Lankan law enforcement,

security and intelligence services, the direct involvement of the LTTE in human smuggling is limited at the Sri Lanka end. As demonstrated in the past, the LTTE however is quite capable of operating through criminal groups – both Sinhalese and Tamils - in Sri Lanka without showing its hand. Traditionally, smuggling of Sri Lankans is mostly conducted by economically motivated Sri Lankan individuals and very small groups with linkages to networks in Southeast Asia and beyond. With the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka, the LTTE is using its extant organized crime network of cells and assets (from front companies to ships) overseas to move people.

Since the LTTE was dismantled in Sri Lanka in May 2009, this network has morphed. The LTTE campaign in Sri Lanka was fought largely on locally recruited youth and funds generated outside of the country. Although the LTTE raided military camps for weapons in the early period, subsequently the LTTE procured most of its weapons from North Korea and dual user technologies from East Asia especially Singapore, Japan, and China, and Australia. Asia, LTTE's key hubs for moving funds, procuring supplies and shipping, remained the key theatre for LTTE activities, even after its defeat. The LTTE international network harnessed its robust infrastructure for raising funds, procuring and shipping supplies to support its economic and political survival. Rather than dismantling the infrastructure, the current LTTE leadership is exploiting it advance its aims and objectives. While some individuals have lost their political content and are driven by economic motive, the main body of LTTE international is still political. However, the criminal faction of the group is still engaged in human smuggling. Furthermore, the LTTE has infiltrated and established control over other individuals and their networks. The LTTE influenced networks are disciplined, clandestine, and resilient. In many ways, the capabilities inherent in the LTTE are now percolating to the criminal domain. Compared to other Sri Lankan criminal networks, the LTTE controlled or influenced networks are the hardest to dismantle. It will require significant investment of resources by several government agencies to study and map the network. Furthermore, considerable coordination and collaboration is necessary to detect, disrupt and dismantle this network. As a highly disciplined and a secret organization, the LTTE criminal network presents the biggest threat. It draws LTTE members from both underground and aboveground networks.

LTTE Arms Procurement:

Starting in 1984, KP was responsible for building LTTE's arms procuring network from Lebanon, Bulgaria, Ukraine and North Korea to sustain LTTE's guerrilla and terrorist campaign. Until the LTTE structure was intact, the LTTE functioned in northern Sri Lanka, key decisions were made by Prabhakaran and LTTE H.Q in Sri Lanka gave instructions overseas. The centre of gravity of LTTE procuring and shipping operations moved from the Middle East to Eastern Europe and then to East Asia. Although Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, remained an important

theatre for LTTE procurement, North Korea became the key country for LTTE procurement after 1996. Indonesia was the main centre for coordinating procurement and shipping operations.¹⁰ The detections of arms consignments on land and arms ships provides a reasonably good picture of LTTE procurement.

On December 13, 1990, the Malaysian Customs in Penang detained the LTTE ship MV Sun Bird transporting a consignment of arms, ammunition and dual technologies According to the Malaysian Special Branch the ship was transporting:

2600 x rounds of Blank Ammo

03 x Large Speed Boats

08 x Johnson & Yamaha Out Board Engines

324 x Transceivers – Base Stations

440 x Walkie – Talkies (Hand Held Sets)

6000 x Batteries

The Malaysian Special Branch also raided LTTE safe houses in Malaysia and recovered financial and other documents that provided an insight into the LTTE international network, both its bank accounts and its operatives. The documentation recovered revealed among other information: how the LTTE was operating through front organizations in the West, how the LTTE had a budget to penetrate the human rights groups and the U.N.¹¹

On November 18, 1991, the Indian Navy detained the LTTE ship “MV Tongnova” carrying a consignment of military equipment.

7.4. In August 1994, the LTTE successfully procured and transported 60 Metric Tones of High Explosives (RDX and TNT) from Ukraine on board the LTTE ship M.V. Baris. The World Tamil Movement, the premier LTTE front in Canada, provided the funds to procure this consignment through a bank account in Hong Kong Shanghai Bank in Vancouver.¹² Among other attacks, the LTTE used these explosives to conduct suicide attacks on Central Bank in Colombo on Jan 31, 1996 & Hotel Galadari in Colombo on Oct 15, 1997. The latter target was selected by the LTTE because the intended target, the newly inaugurated World Trade Centre, could not be successfully attacked.¹³

On February 13, 1996, the Sri Lanka navy and air force sank the LTTE ship “MV Horizon” carrying a consignment of explosives and other military equipment

On 03 March 1999, Sri Lanka Navy and Indian Navy sank the LTTE ship “MV Mariamma” carrying a large consignment of Military equipments in the Mullaitivu seas.

On April 9, 2000, the Marine Police raided the LTTE boatbuilding yard in Phuket and recovered among other items:

Built Submersible / Mini – Submarine,

Water-Scooters,

Speed Boats

The manager of the LTTE boatyard Christy Reginold Lawrence was detained by the Thai authorities but a British woman working for the LTTE U.K. office posing off as a representative of Amnesty International secured his release. Christy Reginold Lawrence, a Norwegian citizen of Sri Lankan origin, since then lives in Norway .

On February 28, 2002, the Thai police in Ranong, north of Phuket, recovered C4, TNT, grenades, RPG rounds and detonators destined to LTTE.

On 12 May 2003, the Thai Police arrested 03 LTTE cadres and recovered a cache of military hardware destined to LTTE on Ranong, the Thai Burmese border. The authorities recovered 10 Glock pistols, 3 HK Mark 23 pistols and 45,000 rounds of assorted ammunition. The LTTE cadres were prosecuted.

On March 4, 2004, the Police in Bangkok recovered a large remote control helicopter destined to LTTE. The LTTE planned to place a small charge in the helicopter and guide it to a target.

In October 2003, the LTTE delegation that traveled for talks with the government in Oct 2003 brought equipment for the LTTE in Colombo from Ireland as personal items. -

10 or 12 Radars for Sea Tigers Boats

02 x Kenwood VHF sets.

03 or 04 Walkie Talkie

LTTE Shipping Network:

The ships from 1984-2001 included:

1. MV Cholan, the first ship purchased by the LTTE from Singapore in 1984.
2. M.V. Illiyana, purchased and operated Asia,
3. M.V. Sunbird, detained by the Malaysian authorities,
4. M.V. Golden Bird,
5. M.V. Ahat, destroyed by Indian navy as M.V. Yahata,
6. M.T. Showamaru, a Japanese merchant tanker,
7. M.V. Omiross,
8. M.V. Emerald,
9. M.V. Swene, also operated as M.V. Baris,
10. M.V. Akatsu, Japanese built,
11. UV Blue Hawk, a 96 seater passenger ferry, but used as a utility vessel for transporting cargo, Japanese built with a US engine,
12. M.V. Satsuma, Japanese built,
13. MV Orion 1,
14. FV Horizon,
15. M.T. Mariama, Japanese built,
16. M.V. Daishin, Japanese built,
17. M.V. Seishin, Japanese built,
18. U.V. Magamai, Japanese built,
19. U.V. Rakuy, Japanese built,
20. M.V. Matsushima, Japanese built
21. M.T. Shoshin, Japanese built
22. M.T. Manyoshi, Japanese built
23. M.V. Shinwa, Japanese built

24 M.V. Seiko, Japanese built

After 2001,

25. M.T. Seyo, Japanese built

26. M.T. Koshia, South Korean built

27. M.T. Kyoi, Japanese built

28. M.T. Koi, Japanese built

The K.P. Department led by Kumaran Pathmanathan alias K.P. operating since 1984 was revamped. On visit to Sri Lanka, Ponniah Anandarajah met with Prabhakaran, the then LTTE leader, and Pottu Amman, the then LTTE intelligence Chief, and discussed the creation of a new structure. The responsibility for managing international finance, procurement and shipping was transferred to Castro in the LTTE H.Q. in Sri Lanka. K.P. was replaced by his assistant Ponniah Anandarajah alias Rajah alias Aiyyah, a U.S. citizen and a double accountant. Born on October 13 1949 in Chankani, Jaffna, Aiyyah is a naturalized US Citizen bearing Passport no 110177247 issued in New York on March 13, 1989. After serving in Saudi Arabia, he relocated to the U.S where he was recruited by K.P. into the LTTE starting with managing a LTTE office in Greece. In 2003, when the K.P. Department was restructured and reorganized under Aiyyah, the new international leader, a specialist unit was created to engage in clandestine activities. The newly established International Intelligence Division under Nadarasa alias Ayaannan alias Aiya operating out of Malaysia had three branches:

- (1) Finance (heroin and other drugs, human smuggling)
- (2) Purchase weapons
- (3) Kidnap targets in Colombo and demand ransom

8.3. A native of Pandatherippu in Jaffna, Nadarasa joined the LTTE in March 1986. A fair well built six footer with a greenish birth mark on the right side of the forehead, Nadarasa trained in LTTE's first batch in Sri Lanka.¹⁴ Nadarasa was placed in charge of Weligamam in Jaffna peninsula in 1990, appointed assistant leader Jaffna District in 1992, and was injured due to firing in 1992. In 1995 after the Sri Lankan military recovered Jaffna, Nadarasa headed Yalselum Padayani, a special unit formed to target military. In 2002, Prabhakaran sent him overseas¹⁵ and in 2003 was entrusted with this responsibility. Based out of Malaysia, Nadarasa's team consisted of Karthegeesan alias Anandan, Dhiransen Tilak alias Isaiwanan, Subramaniam Sudaharan alias Malarawan, Pushpakanthan alias Mangui, Velayidum Sudaharan alias Kapil Master, Robinson alias Ponguil. The

kidnapping of Inspector of Police Jayaratnam, a Tamil officer in Colombo was planned with inputs from the International Intelligence Division. Arrested for drug trafficking in Malaysia, Nadarasa was released in 2004. There were other LTTE cadres including leaders arrested for drug trafficking.¹⁶ Siranjeevi Master, a LTTE intelligence trained cadre, who joined the LTTE in 1989 was in Anna Nagar, India, in charge of heroin operation for LTTE.

After K.P. was sidelined in 2003, the procurement and shipping operations were separated. While Aiyiah was entrusted with the responsibility for overall procurement, Kandiahpillai Bakerathan alias Bhavi alias Bahi alias Khan was entrusted with the overall responsibility for managing the shipping network. The shipping network has been mapped based on debriefings those who were a part of the network including captains, crew, procurement officers. In addition to the chief of communication of the EEZ-MLST Arulananthan Nishantha alias Illankottuwan, this included others who developed their knowledge from listening to the secret communication between LTTE HQ and the ships.¹⁷

The LTTE built a strong relationship with North Korea to procure armaments starting in 1996. By 1999, the transactions demonstrate that the LTTE relied on North Korea extensively. On May 3, 1999, immediately after M.V. Shinwa was purchased by the LTTE, both Shinwa and Matsusima went to North Korea over a span of one week. While M.V. Matsusima was loaded with 10 numbers of 82mm mortar weapons, ten numbers of PK LMG rifles and other small weapons, M.V. Shinwa was loaded with 120mm machine guns and 20,000 shells. While Rajendram Karunakaran alias Pradeepan from the War Materials Production Unit travelled to the equator south of Sri Lanka on this ship with Captain Kamal, Nathan from Point Pedro remained in North Korea.¹⁸

In the second half of 1999, M.V. Shinwa travelled to North Korea to transport 5000 numbers of 130mm shells, 50 tons of TNT, 25 tons each of RDX and C-4 explosives.

In March 2000, MV Matsusima transported 6 numbers of 130mm machine guns, 10 000 number of shells for 130mm guns, 10 numbers of 82 mm mortar weapons, and 10 000 numbers of mortar barrels. Both Nathan and Kamal travelled from North Korea to Sri Lanka.

Around August 2000, Pradeepan travelled on the ship M.V. *Seiko*, the largest ship owned by the LTTE, to North Korea to transport another weapons consignment. The shipment included 10 numbers of 120mm mortar weapons and 10 000 numbers of shells, ten numbers of 17.5mm weapons, 3000 numbers of shells for 107mm weapons. Pradeepan remained in North Korea.

The ship *MV Shinwa* arrived in North Korea around January 07, 2001. The ship was loaded with 9 numbers of 152mm weapons and 10 000 numbers of shells.

As demonstrated, the LTTE procured the bulk of the weapons from North Korea. However, for certain specialized weapons such as Surface to Air Missiles essential to turn the battle in LTTE's favor, they turned to the U.S for procurement. Bold and willing to accept the risk, the LTTE financiers and procurement officers tried to bribe U.S. government officers and procure from the U.S. The LTTE decision to procure weapons in the US led the West to share their intelligence on the LTTE procurement and shipping network with Sri Lanka and their counterparts. The FBI in the US mounted operations against two dozen LTTE procurement officers and others attempting to purchase SA18, missile launchers, AK 47 rifles and other weapons on US soil in August and September 2006.

As some LTTE operatives operated across the borders, the RCMP and FBI co-investigated and mounted joint operations. The British and the Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies worked with their US and Canadian counterparts leading to the uncovering of the LTTE fundraising, procurement and shipping network. Thavarasa Pratheepan alias Sampras Thavaraja alias Tambi Sampras arrested by Indonesian Police when he was bound to fly Malaysia on January 04, 2007 and handed over to FBI for further investigation. He was involved in abortive purchase of SAM missiles to the LTTE. As exemplified below, the sharing of specific intelligence led to the detection and disruption of the LTTE shipping network by the Sri Lankan navy. There were other governments, including India that assisted with both the intelligence and the interdiction. With the improved quality of intelligence, the Sri Lankan navy developed the capacity to go out at sea and strike. The destruction of the bulk of the LTTE fleet in 2006, 2007 and 2008, the LTTE could not replenish its material losses.

The Operation of LTTE ships:

The LTTE vessels smuggling arms, ammunition and other supplies to northern Sri Lanka turned the battle in favor of the LTTE. After September 11, 2001, the quality of intelligence on the LTTE ships improved.

LTTE MT Koi Maran captained by Lt.Col. Silappasan alias Silambarasan alias Ranjan was destroyed on March 10, 2003. The tanker was transporting 3000 numbers of 120 mm shells, 3500 numbers of 82 mm shells, 1500 numbers of 130 mm shells. When the LTTE was in the process of unloading material from the ship, the Sri Lankan Navy destroyed it about 180 nautical miles off the Mullaitivu coast.

LTTE MT Soishin captained by Major Nirmalan was destroyed on June 14, 2003. The vessel was transporting 300,000 - 500,000 litres of fuel, 25,000 numbers of artillery and mortar shells, 04 numbers of artillery guns, 20 numbers of mortar guns, 25 numbers of Yamaha 250 and 25 numbers of Suzuki outboard motors 10,000 kg of C4, RDX, TNT, 5000 kg of food and 5000 meters of cloth. The vessel was interdicted off Mullaitivu by the Sri Lanka navy and the Sri Lankan air force.

During the attack on MT Soishin, LTTE MT Kioshi captained by Stephen escaped. Arrested and released by the Indonesian authorities, Stephen continued to serve on board LTTE ships.

LTTE M.T. Koshia captained by Kamal transported 50 Tones of C4, 10,000 numbers of T-56 weapons, 100 million rounds of ammunition and 120 mm mortar shells in November 2004.

LTTE MV Shinwa captained by Kamal and Vinod transported 20,000 numbers of 120 mm shells, 500 numbers of AK 47 weapons, 300 numbers of pistols, 4 numbers of anti-tank weapons, and 100 PK weapons (35 mm cannon) between 2005-6.

LTTE MV Shinwa transported 5000 numbers of 130mm shells, 50 tons of TNT, 25 tons each of RDX and C-4 explosives from North Korea to Sri Lanka in late 2007. As of May 2009, the ship was anchored in the seas off Indonesia. The telephone number used by Kamal during that period was +873763596665.

The LTTE vessel captained by Stephen alias Lt. Col. Maniyan was transporting weapons from the equator to the north was destroyed on September 17, 2006. Both the Sri Lankan navy and the Sri Lanka air force targeted this Indonesian built fast vessel off Kalmunai in Eastern Sri Lanka.

The LTTE vessel Marudu was destroyed by the Sri Lanka navy on September 26, 2006. The vessel, 35 NM off Arippe in the west coast was transporting weapons.

The Disruption of the LTTE Shipping Network:

The decline of the LTTE was driven by four factors. One of them was the destruction of the LTTE shipping fleet. The others were the defection of Karuna, the overall military commander and Eastern commander of the LTTE over a disagreement with Prabhakaran, the increase in the Sri Lankan military strength enabling the military to fight in multiple theatres, and LTTE conscription and taxation. The LTTE failed to replenish its material wastage by sea.

LTTE MT Kioshi captained by Murugan with 16 crew members was destroyed off Dondra by the Sri Lanka Navy on February 28, 2007. The ship transported about 600 numbers of 120mm shells, 150 numbers of 130mm shells, and 25 barrels of aircraft fuel on the ship. The LTTE ship was 185 NM in the southern seas off Dondra.

An Indian trawler Sri Krishna hijacked by the LTTE was transporting weapons. When interdicted, it fired at the Maldivian Coast Guard on May 17, 2007. The Coast Guard sank trawler and rescued the Indian engineer and prosecuted the LTTE crew. The debriefing provided insights into where the LTTE warehouses were floating.

LTTE MT Eyoshi, a new tanker, captained by Lt. Col. Issaikon was destroyed on March 18, 2007. The tanker carried T56 guns, 130 and 152 artillery guns, 130, 120, and 85 mortar guns, and 130 mm, 152 mm, 122 mm, 120 mm, 81 mm shells. In addition to oil, grease and a heavy electric engine, cloth to stitch military uniforms and shoes, the ship also carried outboard engines – Suzuki, Yamaha, Johnson 250 hp. The vessel was destroyed by the Sri Lanka navy in the seas southeast of Arugam Bay.

LTTE M.T. Koshia captained by Amman was destroyed together with two others ships in the seas southeast of Dondra by the Sri Lankan navy on September 10/11, 2007. The ship, also known as MV Goishin alias MV Joishin alias MV Jeishin, had the IMO No. 8518948. In addition to transporting 29,000 artillery rounds (152mm and 122mm) and artillery guns,¹⁹ the ship was transporting 9,000 numbers of 82 mm shells, 1500 numbers of 130 mm shells, and 50,000 numbers of 152 mm shells and an unknown quantity of air fuel.

LTTE M.V. Seishin captained by Sobithan was destroyed in September 2007. Also known as MV Mann, the old cargo vessel with the IMO No. 8312825 was transporting mortar launchers, 60mm and 120mm shells, artillery guns, 2.7 mm and 14.5mm guns, 40-50 barrels of air fuel and 7000 cloth rolls for uniforms.²⁰

The ship was destroyed together with two others ships in the seas southeast of Dondra by the Sri Lankan navy on September 10/11, 2007.

LTTE M.T. Manyoshi captained by Senpakavenan alias Senpgaselvan alias Semba was destroyed together with two others ships in the seas southeast of Dondra by the Sri Lankan navy on September 10/11, 2007. The ship with the IMO No. 8106513 was transporting a bullet proof vehicle, radars, GPS, uniform cloth materials, small arms and ammunition.²¹ MT Manyoshi was anchored off Indonesia and maintained a floating armory. Bahi in Indonesia provided the food and fuel.

LTTE MV Matsusima captained by Kapilan alias Kabilian was destroyed by the Sri Lankan navy on October 7, 2007. The ship with the IMO No. 8221571, was transporting 2000 numbers of 130 mm shells, 1000 numbers of 152 mm shells, 700 number of 140 mm shells, boat engine parts, HF sets, 03 numbers of aircraft, one number of land cruiser jeep, 1 number of bullet proof land cruiser jeep, torpedoes, torpedo launchers, sonar, ski jets, diving equipment, swimmer delivery vehicles, and water scooters.²²

On July 30, 2009, Sri Lanka's State Intelligence Service reported to the Security Council of Sri Lanka presided over by the President of Sri Lanka that two LTTE captain remained overseas.

A copy of the presentation slide attached identified two LTTE captains. First, as captain of M.V. Princess Easwary, Captain Kamalraj Kandasamy attempted to transport the last consignment of arms, ammunition and explosives from North Korea to Sri Lanka but had to dump it in the sea. After renaming it M.V. Ocean Lady, Captain Kamalraj Kandasamy and his crew transported to Canada illegally LTTE members, LTTE family members, and Sri Lankan Tamils who paid for their voyage. Second, Captain Vinod, who was captain of Matsusima and Kio, remained back in Southeast Asia to transport other LTTE members. As of April 2010, Captain Vinod was planning to transport another group of LTTE and non LTTE Tamils from Indonesia-Thai- Malaysian waters to Canada.

Current State of the Leadership and Fighting Force:

Following Prabhakaran's death on May 19, 2009, KP succeeded Prabhakaran as the leader of the LTTE. Sidelined from 2003-8, KP returned to prominence when Prabhakaran appointed KP as the head of the International Relations Department on December 31, 2008. After Anton Balasingham's death on December 14, 2006, except Visvanathan Rudrakumaran and K.P., there was no one of international stature that could speak for the LTTE outside Sri Lanka. In his new role, KP together with Rudrakumaran, Jay Maheswaran, Nehrujee Puwaneswararajah alias Neil Nehrugee and a few other leaders decided to abandon participation, advocacy and support for terrorism. Nonetheless, some of the the LTTE leaders managing

the funds were not well disposed towards LTTE's shift towards politics. They included Kanakalingam Premaraj alias Reggie, the Executive Director of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, based in the U.K. Reggie who held most of the LTTE assets followed by Kandiahpillai Bakerathan alias Bhavi, Ruban, *Ratnasabapathi Narendran alias Naren* and Sivarasa Pirundaban alias Achchudan alias Suresh alias Achchu. Furthermore, LTTE leaders such as Shanmugasundaram Kanthaskaran and Ravi Shankar Kanagarajah engaged in criminal enterprise wanted to continue with human smuggling and other activities. However, KP prevailed. With the support of Rudrakumaran, K.P. functioned for two and a half months seeking to create a Provisional Transnational government of Tamil Eelam. As a lawyer living in New York, he was careful not to get implicated in violence. He was the principal brain behind KP's political announcements. He was aware that the US and other governments were watching him. The rendition of KP from Malaysia to Sri Lanka on August 5, 2009 enabled the Sri Lanka and other governments to assess the threat from LTTE overseas network. While Rudrakumaran is the public face of the LTTE, Perinpanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyan, now leads the LTTE.²⁶

The centre of gravity of LTTE activities had shifted from Sri Lanka to overseas after its military defeat in May 2009. To build support for its aims and objectives, the LTTE seeks to politicize, radicalize and mobilize the Sri Lankan Tamils worldwide. Today, the total population of Sri Lankan Tamils and foreign nationals of Sri Lankan Tamil origin are estimated at over 1 million. This includes, Canada hosts about 300,000, U.K. 100,000, India, 60,000, Australia 40,000, Germany 60,000, France 60,000, Switzerland, 40,000, USA, 35,000, Italy, 25,000, Netherlands, 20,000, New Zealand, 15,000, Scandinavia 20,000. Malaysia and Singapore host sizable Tamil populations. Sri Lankan Tamil chain migration, both legal and illegal continues. The LTTE continues to play a limited but a decisive role in human smuggling.

The government detained for rehabilitation 10,000 LTTE cadres that either surrendered or were identified in centre housing Internal Displaced Persons. The government freed and confined 300,000 displaced Tamils taken hostage and used as a human shield by the LTTE to temporary welfare centres for resettlement. Although a few LTTE cells overseas attempted to revive the violence, the government working with their foreign counterparts responded decisively. This included the rendition of significant LTTE leaders. The government is planning to devolve political power to areas inhabited by Tamils. The government has yet to develop a robust engagement strategy vis-à-vis the diasporic Tigers.

Post-Defeat Developments:

Although the LTTE as a terrorist group in Sri Lanka was defeated by the military in May 2009, it still exists as a political movement and a criminal organization. After the rendition of K.P., the LTTE global network factionalized. There were

two key factions: the Nediyan faction and the Rudrakumaran faction. Although both these factions were committed to a separate state, their methods and motivations differed. While Rudrakumaran faction abandoned violence, Nediyan faction remained committed to a continuity of violence. Working with all the key criminal elements of the LTTE – Ravi Shankar Kangarajah, Kanakalingam Premaraj, Shanmugasundaram Kanthakaran - the Nediyan faction use LTTE flags, Prabhakaran's image and armed struggle as a rallying point. Nonetheless, to survive internationally, Nediyan worked with Father S. J. Emmanuel, and others to launch the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) in 2010. The Rudrakumaran faction was sensitive to international opinion about Prabhakaran, the Tiger flag and armed struggle. While the Nediyan faction was supported by the less educated Tamils – mostly labor workers in continental, the Rudrakumaran faction is supported by the educated Tamils living in the US and elsewhere. The Nediyan faction's motive is to raise funds. He realized that there was a segment of Tamils radicalized by the LTTE that still believed that Prabhakaran was alive. In fact, some prayed and waited in hope for Prabhakaran to emerge on Nov 26, 2009, the day of his birthday. Although Nediyan himself knew that Prabhakaran was dead, he did not acknowledge it as their main aim was to keep the money flow.

Nediyan is seeking to reorganize the LTTE. The nominee of Castro, the LTTE leader responsible for international operations, Nediyan is supported by Kanakalingam Premaraj alias Reggie, the head of TRO, living in the UK. When K.P. tried to bring Reggie under his control after Prabhakaran's death, Reggie remarked that even when Prabhakaran was alive the LTTE leader wanted the LTTE international network to be compartmentalized. Reggie remarked that Prabhakaran did not want any one single person to control the network as taking him down will damage the network gravely. As Reggie had always operated independently for security reasons, Reggie did not wish to submit to KP's authority especially his sources of finance. Having invested the funds from real estate to other businesses, Reggie, Bhavi, Ruban, Narendran, Achchu and a few others continue to hold on to these funds. Let by Nadarasa, the LTTE criminal enterprise clandestinely engaged in narcotics, credit card, bank and cheque fraud and human smuggling. The need for the LTTE to engage in criminal activity persisted because of the difficulty of raising funds from Tamils after the LTTE was defeated in Sri Lanka. When LTTE collectors requested Tamils for funds immediately, people question "why political engagement requires money." People were under the impression that the LTTE needed money only if they were fighting. Aware of the changing domestic and international environment, even some of the LTTE leaders who engaged in criminal activity have cooperated or expressed their willingness to cooperate with governments. However, a few such as Shanmugasundaram Kanthakaran remain committed to the lucrative criminal enterprise.

The Sri Lankan government intends to engage Sri Lankan Tamil leaders including LTTE leaders who reject violence to join the political mainstream. In cooperation with other governments, Sri Lankan government intends to freeze and seize LTTE

assets overseas. Sri Lanka government also intends to identify and criminalize through foreign governments and INTERPOL LTTE leaders that continue to engage in criminality and terrorism.

To survive and to revive, the LTTE needs to reinvent itself to the changing international environment. Since the LTTE was militarily dismantled in Sri Lanka in May 2009, the overseas network of the LTTE enabled the LTTE leaders and members that survived the fight in Sri Lanka to relocate and reestablish themselves. Some of the LTTE leaders and members that fled Sri Lanka have joined either the aboveground political network or the underground criminal networks. After the death of Prabhakaran, the LTTE has organizationally reinvented itself as the Global Tamil Forum and is seeking to build a transnational government. Supported by multiple LTTE fronts, GTF consist of the [US Tamil Political Action Council](#), [Tamils Against Genocide](#), [New Zealand Tamil Society](#), [Australian Tamil Congress](#), [Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations](#), [Australian Tamil Electoral Lobby](#), British Tamil Forum, Canadian Tamil Congress, [Tamil Youth Organisation - AU](#).²⁷ Although the idea of a transnational government always remained even when the LTTE was active in Sri Lanka, it became a reality only after Prabhakaran was killed. For the launch of the GTF and the transnational government the LTTE used the constituency pressure to get the support of several deputy prime ministers, ministers, senators, congressman, and parliamentarians.

Attempts by the LTTE international network to revive the LTTE in Sri Lanka have failed. However, LTTE's message to the Sri Lankan Tamils has limited appeal. The influence of the LTTE on Sri Lankan and diaspora Tamils continues to decline steadfastly. Like the Babar Khalsa influence on the Sikhs both in Punjab in India and overseas including in Vancouver declined after the death of their leaders, the LTTE propaganda today has limited meaning. After 30 years of ethnic-baiting by the LTTE, most Sri Lankan Tamils simply do not care if a person is Tamil, Sinhala or Muslim. With the other communities, the Tamils living in Sri Lanka want co-exist. They are quite contented with the unparalleled economic development of the north and east since the conflict ended in May 2009. Over time, they are likely to play a prominent role in both economic and political life of Sri Lanka.